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1.1  Introduction 
Japan has had a serious housing problem throughout most of  the postwar 
period. Although the problem of  absolute scarcity of dwellings no longer ex- 
ists, housing conditions remain extremely unsatisfactory today although Japan 
has become one of the world’s largest economic powers. Spaces are narrow, 
locations are inconvenient, and related social infrastructures are insufficient. 
Above all, houses are extremely expensive. 
One may propose a number of reasons why the housing problem remains 
serious in Japan. But no one would deny that the single most important reason 
is land prices, which are significantly higher than in other countries and have 
continued to rise almost every year during the postwar period. The sharp rise 
in land prices during the latter half of the 1980s has aggravated the problem. 
It is widely recognized that the land price problem is not only the heart of the 
housing problem but also one of the most serious social and economic prob- 
lems of present-day Japan. 
In this paper, I discuss major issues related to the land problem in Japan, 
focusing on the land price issue. In section 1.2,  I present several facts and data. 
I point out that the housing problem in large cities in Japan is almost synony- 
mous with the land price problem, because most of  the housing cost consists 
of land purchase cost. I also point out that the extraordinary land price inflation 
during the 1980s in the Tokyo and Osaka areas has considerably lowered the 
house-purchasing power of wage income. Section 1.3 is the discussion of the 
cause of the recent land price inflation. The focus of the discussion is bubble 
versus fundamentals. My conclusion is that the land price inflation during the 
1980s cannot be explained unless the bubble element is introduced. This is 
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demonstrated in two ways: first, by showing a difference between present dis- 
counted value of rents and the actual land price, and second, by showing the 
deviation of the actual price from the price obtained from a land price equation. 
Section 1.4 is an examination of  structural factors underlying the chronically 
high land price in Japan. I argue that the essential cause for high land prices is 
not the absolute shortage of land but various social and economic factors that 
enhance the value of land as a type of marketable asset. Particularly important 
are distortions brought about by the tax system and the Land Lease Law. Fi- 
nally, in  section  1.5, I review recent trends in government land policies and 
discuss their implications. 
1.2  The Housing Problem and the Land Price Problem 
1.2.1  Share of Land Purchase Cost in Housing Cost 
In order to evaluate the relative weight of the land price problem in the hous- 
ing problem, I calculate the share of  land purchase cost in housing cost for 
model cases in several Japanese cities.’ The figures shown in table I.  1 indicate 
a large regional difference in the nature of the problem. In local cities, the 
share is less than one-half. In small local cities, it is somewhere around 30-40 
percent. This ratio is about the same as that in other countries. Thus, in these 
cities, the land problem is not the major obstacle to improving housing condi- 
tions. 
The situation is considerably different in large cities, however, where the 
land purchase cost is over 60 percent of housing costs. In the Tokyo and Osaka 
areas, it is nearly 90 percent even in suburban sites. The ratio becomes as high 
as 98.5 percent in the central district of Tokyo. In these regions, therefore, the 
housing problem is almost synonymous with the land problem or land price 
problem. 
At this point, one may wonder why Japanese people stick to buying a house 
with land rather than renting a house or buying a house with leased land. One 
reason is the supply-side condition. As discussed in section 1.4,  the new supply 
of  leased land is virtually nil due to the excessive protection of the lessee’s 
right provided by the Land Lease Law. It is true that there are new supplies of 
rented houses, but most of  them are for students, single persons, or couples 
without children who will not occupy the house for a very long period. This is 
due to the protection of tenants provided by the Building Lease Law. It follows 
that one is forced to buy land at a certain stage of one’s life cycle if one wishes 
to live in a decent house. This is true not only for a detached house but also 
for a condominium, because land purchase cost is included in the condomin- 
1. In  this calculation, a detached house of  a standard size (site  167 square meters, house 89 
square meters) is assumed. The land price used in this calculation is local government benchmark 
price (Kijun Chika, July 1989). 13  Land Prices and House Prices in Japan 
Table 1.1  Share of Land Cost in Housing Cost for Model Cases 
Land Price  Land  Construction  Total 
per Square  cost  cost  cost  Ratio 
Meter"  (a)  (b)  (C)  (dc) 
Tokyo 
Minato  580  138,371  2,047  140.41  8  0.985 
Suginami  106  25,289  2,047  27,336  0.925 
Machida  39  9,304  2,047  11,351  0.820 
Osaka  60  10,020  1,469  1 1,489  0.872 
Nagoya  26  4,342  1,469  5,811  0.747 
Hiroshima  17  2,839  1,469  4,308  0.659 
Fukuoka  14  2,338  1,469  3,807  0.614 
Otaru  4  668  1,469  2,137  0.313 
Akita  5  835  1,469  2,304  0.362 
Toyama  8  1,336  1,469  2,805  0.476 
Kurashiki  6  1,002  1,469  2,471  0.406 
Miyazaki  6  1,002  1,469  2,47 1  0.406 
Other big cities 
Local cities 
Nores: Prices are 10,OOO  yen. Assumptions are: (1) site,  167 square meters; house,  89 square 
meters. (2) Housing construction cost per square meter: 230,000 yen in Tokyo, and 165,000 yen 
in other cities. 
"Land price is local government benchmark price (Kijun Chika), National Land Agency (July 
1989). 
ium price. The demand-side reason is that people regard a house as an asset 
that produces capital gain. In fact, it is said that people buy a house in order to 
own rather than to live. 
It follows that, as far as the housing problem in large cities is concerned, the 
land price problem is the most important element. I will therefore confine my 
argument in this paper to the land price issue. 
1.2.2  Level of Land Price 
As is well known, land prices in Japan are extremely high compared to those 
in other countries. Since systematic data are difficult to obtain in other coun- 
tries, a comparison is made here only with U.K. data.* Residential sites that 
command the highest prices in the United Kingdom are located in the inner 
city of  London, and the price of  land was about &4 million per hectare, or 
&100,000 per square meter, in 1986. According to table 1.2, which shows the 
government benchmark prices (Koji Chika) of residential sites in Japan, one 
square meter of  land at locations in Tokyo comparable to the above site in 
London costs &4  million, or forty times that in L~ndon.~  Needless to say, inter- 
2. Valuation Office, Property Market Report no. 46, Autumn 1986. Comparison with the United 
Kingdom is meaningful because its natural conditions are similar to that of Japan. 
3. There are several land price indices: (I) government benchmark price (GBMP, Koji Chika): 
about 70 percent of market price; (2) local government benchmark price (Kijun Chika): same level 14  Yukio Noguchi 




































































































































Source: National Land Agency, Koji Chika (benchmark land price), published yearly. 
Notes: Government benchmark price (Koji Chika). The indices are those of January 1 of each year 
indicated. For example, land price in Greater Tokyo has increased by 234.7/220.2 in 1989. 
national comparison  of  land prices must be done with caution, because the 
underlying legal system as well as the nature of land price in statistics may be 
different in different countries. Even considering these conditions, the above 
data would be sufficient to demonstrate the abnormal level of land prices in 
Japan. 
There is an important caveat to this fact, however. If we compare the cost of 
using space as represented by  office rental, we find no significant difference 
between the two countries. The cost of renting one square meter of office space 
at Marunouchi, a business district of  Tokyo, is around E200,OOO per year in- 
cluding guarantee deposits. In London, it costs E100,OOO at locations compar- 
able to Marunouchi, meaning that office rental at Marunouchi is only twice as 
high as that in London. Thus, space utilization cost as measured by the office 
rental costs in Japan, surprisingly, is not so high as the land price would lead 
us to believe. This poses a puzzle: if land price is the discounted present value 
of rents, why is land price in Japan so high?4 
as the GBMP; (3) assessed price for the inheritance tax (Rosenka): about 70 percent of the GBMP; 
(4) assessed price for the property tax: ratio to the GBMP is lower than the Rosenka. The ratios 
are different in different locations. The GBMPs are calculated for about twenty thousand standard 
points on January  1 every year. Price of  each point is evaluated by  two official appraisers. The 
Evaluation Committee of  the National Land Agency reviews the reports by  the appraisers and 
makes final judgments. The prices are presumed to capture the “normal prices.” Thus both dis- 
counted present value of rentals and actual transaction prices at similar locations are taken into 
consideration. Local government benchmark prices are calculated in a similar way. 
4. Structural factors discussed in section 1.4 provide partial answers. In addition, the difference 
in expected future growth in rentals is an  important factor. While rentals reflect present use of 15  Land Prices and House Prices in Japan 
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Fig. 1.1  Ratio of land asset to GDP 
Note: Land asset is total private land value in the National Account Statistics. 
Source: Economic Planning Agency, Kokumin Keizai Keisan Tokei Nenpo (Yearbook of  National 
Account Statistics), issued yearly. 
1.2.3  Rate of Increase of Land Price 
Figure 1.1 shows the long-run trend of nationwide land value in terms of the 
ratio to GDP. The ratio has a long-run upward trend. This reflects a long-run 
increase in land productivity brought about by  the land use conversion from 
agricultural to urban use and by the accumulation of capital. The average an- 
nual growth rate is about 2 percent for the period 1955 through 1985. Increases 
of this magnitude seem to be reasonable. Thus, as far as the trend in the na- 
tional average until the mid-1980s is concerned, land price increase cannot be 
regarded as e~traordinary.~ 
The ratio shows short-run fluctuations from time to time, however. The devi- 
ation from the trend first occurred in the early  1960s, and then in the early 
1970s. The deviation during the second half of the 1980s is the third burst in 
the postwar period. This kind of fluctuation, rather than the long-run trend of 
land price increase, should be regarded as problematic. 
Table 1.2 shows the trend of  land prices in the three major urban areas in 
Japan during recent years. In Tokyo, land prices almost tripled during 1986 
and  1987. During this period,  income increased  approximately  10 percent. 
Thus, house-purchasing power of wage income decreased to less than one-half 
of what it was two years earlier. 
land, in many cases there are possibilities of converting land into more productive use in the future. 
Such possibilities may be reflected in land price. 
5. Regression analysis in section 1.3 supports the hypothesis that the ratio of land value to GDP 
has been constant since 1977. 16  Yukio Noguchi 
Table 1.3  Ratio of Average Condominium Price to Annual Income 
1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Greater Tokyo  5.64  5.62  5.36  6.48  8.14  8.62 
0-9 !a area  6.93  6.95  7.10  10.89  15.62  15.31 
10-19 km area  6.15  5.78  5.93  7.93  10.43  10.68 
20-30  km  area  5.20  5.12  4.94  5.86  7.25  8.18 
Greater Osaka  4.44  4.36  4.13  4.34  4.94  6.27 
Greater Nagoya  3.53  3.54  3.45  3.51  3.89  4.27 
Source: Toshi Kaihatsu Kyokai, Jutuku Kukaku to Sararimn Syotoku tono Kairi Zesei no ta meni 
(For the reduction of  the discrepancy between housing prices and workers’ income), issued yearly. 
Notes: Average annual salary is 6.4 million yen. (The same figure is used for all areas.) Average 
space of a condominium is 75 square meters. 
Table 1.3  shows this fact in a more concrete way. It is usually said that the 
most expensive house that can be purchased by  an ordinary worker is about 
five times the annual salary. If the price of a house is within this limit, interest 
payments would be less that one-seventh of annual salary in cases where half 
of the purchase cost is financed by a loan and the interest rate is 5 percent. In 
1984, the average price of  a standard condominium in Tokyo was  roughly 
within this limit. But the average ratio of condominium price to annual income 
rose to 8.6 in  1989. This means that the share of interest payments to annual 
income would be 22 percent with the same assumptions. If  we consider the 
repayment of  principal, the total payment would be somewhere around one- 
half of annual income. This means that it has become impossible for an average 
worker to purchase a house in Tokyo, based solely on wage income. 
1.3  An Analysis of the Recent Land Price Inflation 
1.3.1  Is Concentration in Tokyo the Major Cause? 
In  this section, I analyze the extraordinary land price increase during the 
latter half of the 1980s. The most important issue in this discussion is whether 
the major cause was changes in the fundamentals, especially changes in the 
economic structure, or speculative bubbles. “Fundamental price” of land is the 
discounted present value of future rentals. “Bubble” is the difference between 
the actual price and the fundamental price.h 
If  land price increases are caused by  changes in economic structure, the 
increases result from a rise in land productivity. Hence, policies that directly 
aim at reducing land prices should not (or cannot) be taken. Land price reduc- 
6. There are of  course many difficulties in calculating the fundamental price. For example, 
“future rentals” means expected future rentals, which are unobserved variables. Additional diffi- 
culties are discussed in section 1.3.3. 17  Land Prices and House Prices in Japan 
Table 1.4  ’kends in Land Price and Office Rentals (indices: 1980 - 100) 
Land Price, Commercial 
Districts  Office Rental 
Year  Tokyo  Osaka  Tokyo  Osaka  GNP 
1980  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1985  150.6  132.0  128.1  123.3  131.1 
1989  413.9  297.4  23 1  .O  152.0  161.7 
1990  421.7  435.1  258.6  186.4  170.2 
Sources: Land price: National Land Agency, Koji Chika (benchmark land price), issued yearly. 
Office rental: Japan Building Association, Biru Jittai  Chosa no  ta meni (Summary of Building 
Survey),  issued yearly. GNP:  Economic Planning Agency, Kokumin Keizai Keisan Tokei Nenpo 
(Yearbook of National  Account Statistics), issued yearly. 
tion can be expected only as a result of policies such as increases in the supply 
or urban land or diversification of economic activities to local cities. On the 
other hand, if a bubble is the major element, land prices can and should be the 
direct target of land policy, because land prices cannot be regarded as a proper 
signal for allocating the land resource. 
Some people argue that land price inflation during the 1980s was caused by 
structural changes in the Japanese economy, especially the concentration of 
new  economic activities in Tokyo.’  The importance of Tokyo as an interna- 
tional city has undoubtedly increased, and new trends such as the international- 
ization of financial activities have increased the demand for offices, which has 
worsened the shortage of land in the central business district of Tokyo. 
This is reflected in the trend of office rentals. As shown in table 1.4, the rate 
of increase in office rental costs in Tokyo was about the same as that of GNP 
until the mid- 1980s and became greater during the late 1980s. It must be noted, 
however, that the rate of land price increase was greater than that of office rent. 
This means that the land price inflation in Tokyo cannot be explained only by 
the concentration of economic activities in Tokyo. Moreover, the increase of 
land prices was not isolated in the Tokyo area but diffused to other areas. The 
figures in table 1.2 indicate that, while rises in land price in the Tokyo area 
have subsided, the upward pressure on land prices spilled into the Osaka area, 
and then to Nagoya and other regional cities. If the concentration in Tokyo 
were the main cause, land prices in other cities would not have been affected. 
As shown in table 1.4, land prices in Osaka increased remarkably, while office 
rental costs grew at about the same rate as that of GNP. 
7. Miyao (1988) argues that land price movement can be completely explained by changes in 
industrial and urban structure and changes in the interest rate. 18  Yukio Noguchi 
1.3.2  Easy Money Policy 
Let us next look at the relations between land price inflation in the 1980s 
and monetary policy during this period. 
In an effort to curb the sharp appreciation of  the yen following the Plaza 
Accord of September 1985, the Bank of  Japan relaxed monetary conditions 
considerably. The official discount rate,  which was  5  percent  until January 
1986, was lowered in several steps to a historic low postwar level of 2.5 percent 
in February 1987. Long-term interest rates also fell from 6.6 percent in Octo- 
ber  1985 to 5.0 percent in February  1987, and further to 3.8 percent in May 
1987. 
It is generally believed that this provided the major impetus for land prices 
to soar. In fact, this period coincides exactly with the period  in  which land 
prices began to rise, especially in the central district of  Tokyo. (As seen in 
table 1.2, residential land prices in the Special Wards of  Tokyo increased by 
78 percent in 1986.) Thus, there is no denying that the easy money policy was 
one of the major causes of the sharp increase in land prices during the 1980s. 
Let us examine this point further. As shown in table 1.5, net purchases of 
land by  the nonfinancial corporate sector increased  dramatically during the 
latter half of the  1980s. Cumulative purchases during 1985-89  amounted to 
about 28 trillion yen. This exceeds the amount during the preceding five years 
by as much as 25 trillion yen. The difference can be interpreted as “speculative 
purchase.” This amounts to 4.4 percent of  the total holding of  land by  that 
sector, which was 567 trillion yen at the end of 1989. 
On the other hand, lending from banks to real estate businesses increased 
by  about 22 trillion yen  during the same period. Besides, there was lending 
from “nonbanks” (lending institutions having no deposits). The increase dur- 
Table 1.5  Net Purchase of Land (billion yen) 
Nonfinancial  Household 
































-  10,926 
-  14,475 
Source: Economic Planning Agency, Kokumin Keizai Keisan Tokei Nenpo (Yearbook of National 
Account Statistics), 1990. 19  Land Prices and House Prices in Japan 
ing this period is estimated at about I8 trillion yen. On the other hand, business 
fixed investment by  real estate companies during this period was  12 trillion 
yen. This implies that about 28 trillion yen was spent for purchasing land. 
To be precise, the net land purchase figure and the lending figure cannot be 
compared directly because the former does not include transactions within the 
sector and the latter refers only to the real estate business. However, these dif- 
ferences are not so great, since most of the purchases by  the corporate sector 
consist of  those made by the real estate companies and most of  the sales are 
from the household sector. We  can thus conclude that most of the speculative 
purchases of land were financed by lending from the financial institutions. 
1.3.3  Calculations of the Discounted Present Value of Rents 
I have argued above that the concentration of business in Tokyo and the easy 
money policy may have  contributed to the land price inflation, especially in 
Tokyo. However, this does not mean that land price inflation can be completely 
explained by  the fundamentals. Let us therefore examine how  much of  the 
actual land price increase can be explained by the above factors. 
One way  to do this is to calculate the theoretical price of land, which is 
represented by  the discounted present value of  rent, and compare it with the 
actual land price. This is not straightforward calculation, since the actual rent 
is far below the economically reasonable level, due to the Land Lease Law. 
Therefore, I use the data on rental costs of  office buildings.* Needless to say, 
the result of this practice depends heavily on assumptions concerning the capi- 
talization rate and the expected growth of rentals.’ Here I chose these parame- 
ters so that the calculated land value in the central business district of Tokyo 
(Otemachi) becomes equal to the actual land value.’a Because of this proce- 
dure, results obtained here are only the relative, rather than the absolute, level 
of the theoretical price. 
The results are shown in the “theoretical price” column of table 1.6. In most 
of  the locations in Tokyo, the market price of  land is twice as high as the 
theoretical price. The difference is still larger in Fukoka and Sapporo. The 
8. Theoretical land price was calculated by 
(L  + nB)r = anR -  tL -  snB, 
where L =  land price, n = ratio of the total floor space to site area (number of stories of building 
when 100 percent of site is used), B =  construction cost, a = rentable space ratio, R = rental, t 
= property tax rate on land, s = property tax rate on building, and, r = required rate of return. 
Assumptions used for the calculation are n = 8, b = (10.000 yen per square meter) = 24, Q = 
0.7,  r = 0.0411,  t = 0.005, and s = 0.014. In the case of a residential house, B = 18, n = 1. 
(The value of  B is slightly lower than what was assumed in table  1.1. This is due to the rise in 
construction cost.) 
9. In the regression analysis reported in section 1.3.4, we find that capitalization rate is more 
stable than the actual interest rate. This does not, however, reveal what the appropriate capitaliza- 
tion rate is. 
10. I chose Otemachi as the basis because it is a well-developed area, so that there would rela- 
tively Little speculative element in land price. Since the assumed volumetric ratio is different from 
the actual value, the theoretical price is not exactly equal to the actual price. 20  Yukio Noguchi 
same calculation was done for residential land using the data of apartment 
rentals, and the results are shown as theoretical prices in table 1.7. Again, the 
actual price is about twice as high as the theoretical price. 
From these findings, we can conclude that land is valued considerably above 
its theoretical value. The difference between the theoretical and the market 
prices can be interpreted only as arising from excessive expectations for capital 
gains, namely, a speculative bubble. 
1.3.4  Estimation of the Bubble Using a Regression Model 
Another way to examine the existence and the magnitude of the bubble is to 
estimate a land price equation and to regard the difference between the esti- 
mated and the actual price as the bubble. 
For this purpose, I consider a model in which land rent is a fixed proportion 
of product and land price is determined as its discounted present value. More 
specifically, I estimate the following equation: 
Table 1.6  Prices of Selected Office Sites in Japan 
Annual Office  Theoretical 
Current Market Price  Rental Cost  Price 



































“Current market prices are based on the GBMPs reported in 1987. Those in parentheses are for 
1986. 
bRents are based on a survey reported in the February 23, 1987 issue of Nihon Keiui Shinbun. 
‘Method for calculating theoretical price is described in footnote 8. 21  Land Prices and House Prices in Japan 
Table 1.7  Prices of Selected Residential Sites in Japan 
Location 
Theoretical 
Market Price  Rental Cost  Price 
(Y  1  O,OOO/mz).  (Y10,000/m2 year)b  (Y  10,000/m2) 
Areas bordering on 
the Chuo Line 
Yotsu ya  445 
Nakano  110 
Ogikubo  105 
Musashi-Koganei  48 
Areas bordering on 
the Toyoko Line 
Shoto  545 
Nakameguro  150 
Jiyugaoka  170 
Hiyoshi  54 



















"Market price represents GBMPs reported in 1987 (residential land within the radius of one kilo- 
meter from the nearby railway stations). 
bEstimated rents  for apartments  are based  on advertisements  carried by  Shukan Jufaku Joho 
(Weekly housing news), September 1987 (those units located within a distance of fifteen minutes' 
walk from nearby stations). 
log PLAND = a + b log GDPLND + c log INTRST + d GROWTH  4- 
e ISLAND  +flog NEBDEN f g  log SECOND + 
h log TERTIA, 
where PLAND = real urban land price by prefecture, calculated as land value 
divided by urban area (100 yen per square meter); GDPLND =  real prefecture 
GDP per unit of urban land (100 yen per square meter); INTRST =  long-term 
real  interest  rate  (yield  of  government  bonds,  annual  percentage  rate); 
GROWTH = population growth rate (annual percentage rate); ISLAND  = 
dummy variable equal to one if prefecture is not on Honshu; NEBDEN = 
population density in neighboring prefectures (number of  people per square 
kilometer); SECOND = share of the secondary industry in prefecture GDP 
(percentage); and, TERTIA = share of the tertiary industry in prefecture GDP 
(percentage). 
If  the above theory of  land price determination is correct, and if the long- 
term interest rate is the appropriate capitalization rate, then the coefficients b 
and c should be equal to one and minus one, respectively. The GROWTH vari- 
able is used as a proxy for the expected growth of rents." The ISLAND and 
11. I also tried the rate of growth of prefecture GDP. The coefficients of other variables are not 
significantly affected. Since the use of  population growth produces a better result in terms of the 
standard error and the coefficient of determination, this result is reported here. 22  Yukio Noguchi 
the NEBDEN variables have been used to capture spillover effects of economic 
activity. The former should have a negative sign and the latter a positive sign. 
The SECOND  and the  TERTIA variables are intended to represent possible 
differences in production technologies  in different industries. All nominal vari- 
ables were deflated by the GDP deflator. 
The above equation was estimated using the forty-seven prefectures’ data 
during the period 1977-87.  The result is shown in table 1.8. The equation fits 
well with a fairly high coefficient of determination. All variables except for the 
log SECOND have significant coefficients with the right signs. 
That the estimated value of b is close to unity supports the above theory of 
land price determination.  On the other hand, the absolute value of the estimated 
coefficient of the log ZNTRST variable is significantly smaller than one. This 
seems to imply that the true discount rate used for capitalizing land rent is 
more stable than the observed long-term interest rate. In view of the fact that 
land does not depreciate so that rent can be obtained for infinitely long periods, 
this seems to be a reasonable result. 
From the above analysis, we can conclude that the overall land price move- 
ment can be explained fairly well by  the fundamentals. In fact, land prices 
calculated from this equation fit the actual price fairly well for regions other 
than the Tokyo and Osaka areas. This implies that land prices in these areas do 
not contain bubbles. Even for the Tokyo and Osaka areas, this equation ex- 
plains actual land prices fairly well until the mid-1980s. Considering the rela- 
tion between housing prices and income mentioned earlier, it can be said that 
land prices during this period were approximately the long-run equilibrium 
price. 
For the latter half of the 1980s,  however, actual land prices in the Tokyo and 
Osaka areas deviate considerably from the calculated value. Figure 1.2 shows 
this for Tokyo. This difference cannot be explained by  factors such as land 
productivity and financial factors, and therefore is regarded as a bubble caused 
by  excessive expectations for future capital gains. In Tokyo, the magnitude of 
the bubble was 54 percent of  the actual land price in 1987. 
Table 1.8  Land Price Equation 
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1.4  Structural Factors Underlying the Land Price Problem 
1.4.1  Is Land Absolutely Scarce? 
Section 1.3 discusses the extraordinary land price inflation during the recent 
years.  As mentioned in  section  1.2, another aspect  of  the land problem is 
chronically high land prices. This implies the existence of structural factors. In 
this section, I examine these factors. 
Let us first see if physical constraints are important. Many people argue that 
the scarcity of land is the major cause of high land prices in Japan. It is true 
that the area of land of this country is small compared with other countries of 
similar population and that a large portion of it is covered by  mountains. But 
if  we compare the area of land devoted to urban uses, Japan is not worse off 
than those countries. In fact, the area of urban land accounts for only a tiny 
fraction of the national landmass-2  to 3 percent, depending upon the defini- 
tion of  urbanized area. This is small even in  comparison with the habitable 
area, which is about one-third of the total amount of national land. The amount 
of total land available in Japan has thus little if  anything to do with the land 
problem we face today. 
Even in the urbanized areas, plenty of  land is still underused or left idle. 
According to a survey by  the Ministry of Construction, 65,000 hectares (ap- 
proximately 160,000 acres) of  land within the Greater Tokyo area could be 
developed into housing tracts.I2 This is equal to the area of  the twenty-three 
12. The available land consists of 36,000 hectares (89,000 acres) of  farmland, 23,000 hectares 
(56,800 acres) of underused land (vacant lots and parking lots), and 6,000 hectares (14,800 acres) 24  YukioNoguchi 
wards of Tokyo. Moreover, most of the buildings do not use all the legally 
allowed capacity. To casual observers, urban land in this country may appear 
very densely used. In fact, the opposite is true. The volumetric ratio (the ratio 
of the floor space to the site area) authorized by the building code stands on 
the average at 242 percent, but only 40 percent of the authorized ratio is actu- 
ally used. 
The above fact can also be confirmed by international comparisons of rents. 
As we have seen, space utilization cost in Japan is not much different from that 
of the United Kingdom. This implies that the supply of space for urban use is 
not particularly low as compared to other countries. 
To  summarize, Japan, contrary to widespread belief, still has a surplus of 
land. This suggests that if the degree of land utilization is raised, many, if not 
all, of the problems associated with land will evaporate. 
1.4.2  Distortions in the Tax System 
The above argument suggests that what matters are social and economic 
factors rather than physical or natural factors. The most  important is that 
people regard land as an asset. In fact, the puzzle in section 1.2.2 cannot be 
solved unless we understand that land in Japan is priced as an asset rather than 
as a factor of production. 
One problem lies with the property tax.13 The statutory standard property 
tax rate stands at 1.4 percent. The valuation of land for the property tax rate is 
very low, and the valuation is further lowered to one-quarter in the case of 
small residential sites. This makes the effective property tax rate much lower 
than the statutory rate. 
In the early 1980s, the effective property tax stood at about 0.1 percent of 
the market price of land. As the local governments did not raise valuations in 
accordance with the rising market price in recent years, the effective tax rate 
in the Greater Tokyo area has dropped to about 0.06 percent. Thus, the tax 
liability for owning land has been reduced to a negligible amount. This is a 
major factor that encourages people to treat land as an asset. If it were costly 
to own land, not many people would leave their land vacant or in an inefficient 
use.I4 Another bias exists in the inheritance tax. Inherited land is valued at 
of vacated factory sites, publicly held idle land and idle land belonging to the now defunct Japan 
National Railways. 
13. It is often said that there are other tax advantages. For example, interest payment can be 
deducted, and losses incurred in the transaction can be offset for other income. But these provis- 
ions are not restricted to land. They are admitted to other types of assets as well. 
14. It is generally believed that “the Japanese are deeply attached to the land they own.” This is 
no more true than the contention that “Japan is short of land.” This can be verified by the story 
about nawanobi-the  difference between the area of farmland officially registered with the gov- 
ernment and its actual size. In its early years, the Meiji government (1868-1912)  tried to survey 
the nation’s farmland to use the data for assessing the land tax, which was a fairly heavy tax. Since 
the resistance of  farmers was so strong, it surveyed a few samples where possible  at different 
locations and accepted  voluntary reports filed by  fanners. As a result,  the bulk of  the nation’s 25  Land Prices and House Prices in Japan 
about 70 percent of the GBMP, which itself is about 70 percent of the market 
price. Hence, inherited land is valued at about half the market price for taxation 
purposes. Moreover, for small residential sites, the assessed value is further 
reduced by  one-half. Although assessed prices have been raised to reflect re- 
cent rises in market prices, they were raised at lower rates, with the result that 
inherited land is valued at less than one-half of the market price in the Tokyo 
and Osaka areas. On the other hand, financial assets are assessed at the market 
value. This bias encourages people to hold inheritable assets in  the form of 
land. 
Furthermore, if one purchases land by borrowing money, one can reduce tax 
liabilities  because borrowing can be deducted from the asset.I5  Consider a per- 
son whose asset is valued at x yen for the inheritance tax. If he borrows 2x yen 
and purchases land, his tax liability is reduced to zero. By doing so, he can 
save tx yen of  inheritance tax, where t is the average tax rate. It follows that, 
for this person, effective valuation of  land is 2x + tx rather than the market 
value  Thus, the bias introduced by the inheritance tax has the effect of 
increasing the market price of land. 
1.4.3  The Land Lease Law 
Another problem lies in the Land Lease Law and the Building Lease Law, 
particularly the former. The Land Lease Law was strengthened during World 
War I1 as social legislation with the aim of strengthening the right of the lessee 
by  bending the principle of freedom of  contract provided in the Civil Code. 
During the war, a large number of families were faced with the danger of being 
evicted from their leased land or houses while their heads were called away for 
military duty, and this caused a serious social problem. With a view to pro- 
tecting the right of  the lessee and tenant, the government strengthened these 
laws. Under the strengthened provisions, a land lease contract is automatically 
renewed when the term expires, unless the landlord makes a formal objection 
without delay. The new contract is assumed to continue for the period of thirty 
years where there is a solid structure and twenty years for other cases. The 
objection of a landlord is admitted only in cases when he can show a personal 
farmland was underreported.  One may  argue that farmers of the Meiji period underreported  to 
reduce their tax liabilities because the smaller size they officially registered would not matter, for 
they had no intention of selling it on the market. If the tax rate were as low as the eurrent property 
tax rate, they must have reported the full size of their farmland to protect its commercial value. 
Today, people hold on to their land in anticipation  of  higher prices because their exposure to 
property tax is at a minimum-serving  to underscore that the tax rate, not the attachment to land, 
has profoundly swayed their attitude to landownership. 
15. Since abuses of this provision became so apparent, the government has changed the valua- 
tion procedures. Under the new rule, if land is purchased within  three years before death, it is 
evaluated at the purchase cost. The previous valuation rule still applies, however, for land pur- 
chases before that. 
16. The tax rate t depends on the magnitude of the asset and the number of heirs. For typical 
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need to use the land or other “just causes,” which are interpreted very strictly 
in the court. 
The rents can of course be negotiated between the lessor and the lessee. If 
they fail to reach an agreement, they can request the court to determine the 
“fair and reasonable rent.” Until the judgment is made, however, the lessee 
can continue to use the land by depositing the amount he personally deems 
reasonable to the court. Thus, the landlords have little negotiating leverage, 
and tenants have little incentive to accept increases in rents. As a result, the 
actual rents are left at irrationally low levels, and the rental market does not 
function properly. (Similar conditions exist for building leases. In actual prac- 
tice, however, the revision of rents are more frequent than in the case of land 
lease, because the length of lease is in general shorter for rents.) 
These two laws played a role in protecting  the interest of  the underclass 
during the years following their enactment. Now, however, they have outlived 
their relevance to the changed market reality, because they have in effect dis- 
suaded landowners from leasing their holdings. To landowners, leasing is tan- 
tamount to selling land at a deep discount, whereas they stand to make huge 
capital gains by simply holding on to land, without incurring too much prop- 
erty tax liability. 
Under such conditions, utilization of land actually penalizes its owner; the 
wisest way to manage land is to keep it idle or use it for a temporary purpose 
such as a parking lot until such time as he can make big capital gains on it. 
This is why there are so many vacant lots and underused parcels of land at 
unlikely places in urban areas. 
1.5  Land Policies 
In this section, I review the recent trend of  government land policies and 
discuss necessary directions based on the analyses above. 
1.5.1  Monetary Policy 
The Bank of Japan changed its tight money policy in May 1989, when the 
official discount rate was raised from 2.5 to 3.25 percent. It was raised in sev- 
eral steps, and by the fifth step in August 1990, it became 6.0 percent. Long- 
term interest rates (yield of government bonds) rose from a low of 4.7 percent 
(April-June 1988) to 7.8 percent in August 1990. 
It must be noted, however, that real interest rates did not rise as much as the 
nominal rate, since the rate of  inflation rose during this period. (The annual 
rate of  increase of the CPI, which was 0.1 percent in 1987, rose to 2.3 percent 
in 1989). In fact, the movement in nominal interest rates was not the same as 
that in land prices: land prices in Tokyo stopped rising in 1988, and in Osaka 
they continued to rise during 1989 (see table 1.2). 
In addition to the general tightening of monetary conditions, the Ministry of 
Finance imposed a zero-growth restriction on the total amount of bank lending 
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lending to real estate companies declined during 1990. This had a strong im- 
pact on land transactions and land prices. In fact, land prices in some districts 
in Osaka dropped significantly during the latter half of  1990. 
1  S.2  Strengthening Landholding Taxes 
In order to discourage speculative holding of land, landholding cost has to 
be raised. Strengthening the property tax would be the most powerful method 
to achieve this objective. 
There is, however, strong opposition to this policy. Since more than half of 
all households possess land in some form or other, anti-property-tax feeling is 
strong. Thus, all political parties, including the Communist party, officially 
oppose any increase in the property tax. Confronted with this political condi- 
tion, almost all local governments are reluctant to raise assessments in accor- 
dance with the rise in the market price of land. As a result, effective rates of 
property tax on land continue to fall even as land prices rise. 
In spite of this situation, the national government has significantly changed 
its attitude toward land taxes. The Basic Land Law, which passed the Diet in 
December 1989, recognizes the importance of land tax, though in an abstract 
expression. The Subcommittee of Land Tax, which was established in the Tax 
Council in April 1990, released a report in October 1990, recommending the 
introduction of  a new  landholding tax. The new national tax is imposed on 
relatively large landholdings. If this tax were successfully introduced, land use 
patterns in Japan would change significantly. Unfortunately, however, the new 
tax was weakened significantly by the Liberal Democratic Party (LPD). 
1.5.3 
In view of the fact that the Land Lease and Building Lease Laws are major 
causes of  the land problem, choking the new supply of  land and houses for 
lease, it is necessary to relax the restrictions imposed by them or to completely 
abolish these laws. 
The Legislative Council of the Ministry of Justice has been studying options 
for amending these laws. It released a draft amendment in February 1989 and 
submitted it to the Diet in 1991. The amendment proposed a new type of lease- 
hold called a “fixed-term leasehold,” which was  a step forward. Under this 
arrangement, the lessee must return the land to the landlord when the contract 
expires. The amendment, however, did not pass the Diet, due to objections by 
the opposition parties. 
In principle, liberalization of contracts hurts neither the lessor nor the lessee. 
Unfortunately, this vital point is not recognized by the public, and the present 
laws are still regarded as necessary protection for the underclass. 
1  S.4  Securitization of Land 
Liberalization of the Land Lease Law 
Leasing of land means that its owner keeps economic benefits from owner- 
ship while the land is used by others. As mentioned before, however, few Japa- 
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under the existing Land Lease Law. Under such circumstances, securitization 
is an effective tool for separating ownership from the utilization right. 
One possible method  is  for the government to issue government bonds 
whose value appreciates in step with a rise in the market price of land. This 
bond could be called a “land-price-indexed bond.”  It in effect creates “paper 
land.” The government would be able to use this bond to purchase land, espe- 
cially land held solely for the purpose of obtaining capital gains. If the owners 
of  idle land agree to securitize their ownership, their land can be used by  the 
government or by other public bodies. In this way, the separation of ownership 
and the right to use the land would be realized. 
A  number of  obstacles must be overcome before the land-price-indexed 
bond can be  issued, such as the restrictions imposed by  the Securities and 
Exchange Law  and technicalities of taxation. These notwithstanding, to the 
extent that the land problem in Japan is rooted in the widespread attitude that 
land should be treated as a type of  marketable asset, securitization of  land 
could become one of the most powerful tools of land policy. 
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